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With the increased use of networked computers for critical systems, network
security is attracting increasing attention and computer network intrusions have
become a significant threat to communication and computer networks in recent
years.
The models developed in this thesis represent the first step in modelling of
network attacks. The thesis demonstrates that models that represent network
attacks can be developed and used for both detection and classification. In this
thesis we put emphasis on detection and classification of network intrusions and
attacks using Hidden Markov Models and training on anomalous sequences. We
test several algorithms, apply different rules for classification and evaluate the
relative performance of these. We put emphasis on one particular classification
algorithm that is not dependent on data set properties. Several of the attack
examples presented exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities, due to availability of
data for such attacks. We demonstrate that models for other attacks can be
built following our methods but could not be tested due to lack of data.
The new method proposed in this thesis is highly efficient and captures char-
acteristic features of attacks in short period of time using very low number of
sequences.
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In this chapter we discuss the importance of computer network security and
present the basic types of intrusion detection systems and their main features.
We present an attack taxonomy and explain the terminology used in this the-
sis. Finally we present the motivation for the thesis and outline the remaining
chapters.
1.1 Computer Network Security
With the increased use of networked computers for critical systems, computer
network security is attracting increasing attention and network intrusions have
become a significant threat in recent years. Computer network security is pri-
marily concerned with protecting a particular resource: valuable data or valu-
able information. The number of intrusions is dramatically increasing and
so are the costs associated with them. The number of incidents reported to
Carnegie Melon’s Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center
(CERT/CC) has increased from the range of 2000-3000 in early and mid 1990s
to 9859 in 1999, 21,756 in 2000, 52,658 in 2001 and the data for 2002 indicate
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the number of incidents is in the range of mid 70000s. With an increased under-
standing of how systems work intruders have become more skilled at determining
weaknesses in systems and exploiting them to obtain increased privileges. It is
important to mention that the knowledge necessary to carry out an attack is
decreasing, resulting in a rapid increase of attempted attacks on various systems
and networks. On the other hand, the increasing frequency and complexity of
Internet attacks has raised the level of knowledge required by systems and net-
work administrators to effectively detect intrusions. Another problem that has
appeared in the last couple of years is the appearance of multi-stage attacks that
can be orchestrated to strike multiple targets with different levels of security by
coordinating a number of exploits. An additional difficulty in detecting attacks
is due to the fact that the majority of intruders attacking high profile targets
conceal the true origin of an attack and they rarely indulge in sudden bursts
of suspicious activity that can be easily detected, even by very simple intrusion
detection systems.
The ideal approach to securing the network is to remove all security flaws
from individual hosts, but less expensive and more feasible approaches are used
for securing the computer systems. Most computer systems have some kind of
security flaw that may allow intruders or legitimate users to gain unauthorized
access to sensitive information. Moreover, many computer systems have widely
known security flaws that are not fixed due to cost and some other limitations.
Even a supposedly secure system or network can still be vulnerable to insid-
ers misusing their privileges or it can be compromised by improper operating
practices.
Intrusion detection is based on the fact that an intruder’s behavior will be
2
significantly different from that of a legitimate user. A more precise definition
of computer security is based on the realization of confidentiality, integrity and
availability in a computer system. Confidentiality requires that access to infor-
mation is restricted to users authorized for it (encryption, authentication and
authorization). Integrity requires the stored information not to be altered and
availability requires the computer systems to be available when the authorized
users need them.
The primary sources of information for intrusion detection systems are net-
work activity and system activity. Network-based systems look for specific pat-
terns in network traffic and host-based systems look for those patterns in log
files. In general, network-based IDS can detect attacks that host-based systems
can miss because they examine packet headers and the content of the payload,
looking for commands or syntax used in specific attacks. Another advantage of
network-based IDS is that it is easy to manipulate the log files in host-based
systems and cover traces of the attack, but it is not possible to do so in network-
based systems. Also, network-based systems detect rejected attacks, whereas
host-based IDS are not able to do that. On the other hand, host-based systems
can verify success or failure of the attack, detect specific system activities that
a network-based system is not able to detect and are able to detect encrypted
attacks. This leads us to the conclusion that the best IDS is the mixture of host
and network-based systems.
We can group intrusion detection systems into two classes: anomaly detec-
tion systems and signature based systems. Anomaly detection systems attempt
to model the usual or acceptable behavior. They have high false positive rates
and usually have detection delay. Irregular behavior is flagged as potentially in-
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trusive. Misuse detection refers to intrusions that follow well-defined patterns of
attack that exploit weaknesses in the system. Misuse detection techniques have
high detection rate for already known attacks but even the slightest variation
of an attack signature may cause the system not to recognize the attack. More
detailed description of anomaly and misuse detection systems will be presented
in the following chapter.
1.2 Attack planning and execution
To be able to mount a successful attack on the remote system an attacker has
to collect maximum amount of information about the target system and gain re-
mote or local access to the system. In order to gain information about Internet
(domain name, IP addresses of systems reachable via Internet, TCP and UDP
services running, system architecture, system enumeration), intranet (network-
ing protocols used etc.), remote access (phone numbers, authentication mech-
anisms etc.) and extranet (type of connection, access control mechanism), the
attacker has to perform footprinting of the target system [1]. Footprinting has
several stages. The initial stage after determining the scope of activities (whether
he will scan the whole organization, a subdomain of organization etc.) is net-
work enumeration, where the attacker identifies domain names and networks
related to the system he is footprinting. After successfully performing the net-
work enumeration and identifying all the associated domains he performs DNS
interrogation and finally network reconnaissance which allows the attacker to de-
termine network topology of the discovered networks and potential access paths
into the network. Once the attacker has performed network footprinting, scan-
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ning and enumeration, he at least has the information about the system that is
running and most likely more detailed information about programs installed and
therefore by looking at the list of vulnerabilities of the system he can attack the
network or particular hosts. Less skillful attackers will try to exploit already dis-
covered vulnerabilities hoping that the systems have not yet been patched. That
would result in either unsuccessful attacks due to the fact that, for example, the
attacker mounted an attack written for UNIX system to a Windows machine,
or in the successful exploit due to the fact that the attacker found a network
that doesn’t have a patched version of the system/software. This type of attacks
can be prevented by following newly released lists of vulnerabilities and apply-
ing patches on the system. However, more skillful attackers will perform the
full scanning of the system, find out which system is used, find out all potential
vulnerabilities and apply their own, newly created attacks. A special threat for
the security of UNIX computer systems represent stealthy User-to-Root Attacks,
which were included in the 1999 DARPA evaluation data set [4]. The main pur-
pose of stealthy attacks is to avoid creating familiar attack patterns that make
the attacks easy to detect. In order to avoid detection stealthy attacks should
only open and modify files that are accessed frequently, execute only commonly
used programs, not create new shells owned by root, not execute unusual system
calls (or sequences of system calls) or not create unusual traffic. Network traffic
created by an attack can be monitored using tcpdump. According to [2] the
most important guidelines for creating stealthy User-to-Root attacks are:
1. Attack scripts should be camouflaged during transfer using simple forms
of encryption;
2. All attack commands should be encapsulated into one shell script;
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3. The output of an attack should not be displayed;
4. Mail, HTTP and other common services should be used for data transfer;
5. Encrypted attack exploits should be created using common editors or shell
scripts;
6. Attacks should be spread over multiple sessions and time;
7. Attacks should use common commands and network services;
8. The stealthiness of each attack should be confirmed;
9. Probes should be executed slowly, from multiple sources in random order.
In most cases it is possible to detect all or most of known attacks and con-
struct systems that will successfully detect them, but it is a challenging task to
construct a system that would be able to detect new attacks.
1.3 Attack taxonomy
Kristopher Kendall’s thesis [3], based on the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection
evaluation set has a detailed overview of attacks and their classification. With
the taxonomy presented in [3] each attack can be classified as one of the following:
• Action at one level of privilege;
• Unauthorized transition (from a lower privilege level to a higher privilege
level);
• Action at a higher level of privilege, while the user is at the lower privilege
level.
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In order to perform an attack the attacker needs to gain access to the local
host and exploit a vulnerability in the system. Some methods of transition and
exploitation that were used in the 1998 DARPA evaluation are:
• m - Masquerading: an attacker gains access to a system by misrepre-
senting himself;
• a - Abuse of Feature: a user performs extremely high number of legiti-
mate actions that can lead to system congestion or program failure;
• b - Implementation Bug: bugs in programs can lead to compromising
the whole system. Typical examples are buffer overflows and race condi-
tions;
• c - System Misconfiguration: access is gained due to system miscon-
figuration (i.e. when some accounts are left with guest, anonymous or no
password at all);
• s - Social Engineering: access is gained by fooling an authorized user
into providing information that can be used to break into the system.
In summary, using the taxonomy presented in [4] attacks can be classified as
shown on figure 1.1.
1.4 MIT Lincoln Labs Evaluations
In the MIT Lincoln Labs report [4] results of eight different IDS systems ([5, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12]) were compared. Systems [5, 8, 12] used BSM Solaris host audit
data to detect Solaris R2L (Remote-to-Local) and U2R (User-to-Root) attacks.
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Figure 1.1: MIT Attack Taxonomy.
Systems [8, 12] produced a combined output from both network sniffer data and
host audit data and used network sniffer data to detect R2L and U2R attacks
against the UNIX victims. System [9] used NT audit data to detect U2R and
R2L attacks against the Windows NT victim and [8, 12] used BSM audit data
to detect Data attacks against the Solaris victim. System [11] used information
from a nightly file system scan to detect R2L, U2R and Data attacks against
the Solaris Victim. Three weeks of training data were used, composed of two
weeks of background traffic with no attacks and one week of background traffic
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with a few attacks. The results showed that many stealthy and new attacks were
frequently missed. When designing stealthy attacks, they tried to avoid obvious
patterns that make those attacks easy to detect. It was shown that detection
rates for U2R and Data attacks are generally low for SunOS and Linux victims
where extensive audit data is not available. They also compared performance
of the best IDS in each category (DoS, Probe, R2L and U2R) for old and new
and for old and stealthy attacks. The detection of new attacks was much worse
than detection of old attacks, especially for DoS, R2L and U2R attacks. The
average detection rate for old attacks was 72% and for new attacks only 19%.
Also, stealthy probes and U2R attacks were much more difficult to detect for
network-based IDS that used sniffing data. U2R attacks against a Solaris victim
were accurately detected by host-based intrusion detection systems that used
BSM audit data. Attacks were not detected for various reasons. Signature-
based systems missed new attacks due to inability to recognize variations of old
attacks or because the system did not have a signature for the new attacks.
Stealthy probes were missed because they are executed during extended periods
of time and the systems were trained to recognize only aggressive probes that
exceeded certain thresholds.
1.5 Terminology
The field of intrusion detection is relatively young and many common terms have
a number of meanings. Therefore, this section presents some basic definitions
used in this thesis to avoid ambiguity if multiple definitions of one term exist.
Audit
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(1) to examine a system for security problems and vulnerabilities. (2) to record
and analyze system activity for security problems and vulnerabilities [6]. The
first defined audit activity is referred to as static audit. The second definition
refers to the dynamic activity of monitoring the system state as it changes over
time. Throughout the remainder of this thesis the second definition will be used.
Audit trail
A chronological set of records of system activity [6]. In this thesis audit trail is
a record of system activity.
Buffer overflow
Redirection of the flow of execution of a program to perform some chosen activity
by feeding the program with selected input values.
False negative
Intrusion that is not detected by the intrusion detection system and is classified
as normal activity.
False positive (False alarm)
Normal activity that is classified as intrusion.
Intrusion
(1) inappropriate use of a computer system. (2) penetration of a computer
system by an outsider [6]. Throughout this thesis the second definition will be
used.
Intrusion detection
(1) identifying individuals who are using or attempting to use the computer
system without authorization or who have legitimate access but are attempting
to abuse their privileges.
Misuse
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Inappropriate use of the computer system.
Misuse detection
Identification of any attempted improper or inappropriate use of the system.
Normal
There are many definitions of normal. In this thesis normal behavior will be
the behavior that is not intrusive (does not match the training set of intrusive
behavior).
1.6 Motivation
There exists a sustained need for attack detection and in cases when the attacks
do happen we need to classify them. This thesis demonstrates that it is possible
to model attacks with a low number of states and classify them using Hidden
Markov Models with very low False Alarm rate and very few False Negatives.
Current results through our methods and algorithms do not display any False
Negatives, but we cannot claim that False Negatives will not appear in future
applications. The attacks for which we had most instances and associated data
were attacks exploiting buffer overflows and that is the reason why our exper-
imental results and applications of our algorithms presented in this thesis are
for such attacks. We present performance and experimental results for buffer
overflow attacks, while we describe how it is possible to apply our models and
algorithms for detection and classification developed in this thesis to other at-
tacks as well. We also emphasize that the purpose of our algorithms is not only
the detection and classification of buffer overflows, but they are targeted for de-
tecting and classifying a broad range of attacks (like Remote to Local attacks,
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race condition attacks, etc.). We are aware of the existence of tools for static
code checking and their advantages over Intrusion Detection Systems [43, 44, 42].
If implemented correctly and in all programs all buffer overflows would be de-
tected. However, they also have some disadvantages (high false alarms, high
false negatives, cannot detect all network attacks etc.) and are not applied in
all programs. A detailed analysis and comparison is presented in Chapter 3.
1.7 Thesis organization
The first chapter of this thesis provided background on current issues in the field
of intrusion detection, attack taxonomy and attack organization. It also provided
basic definitions that are relevant for this thesis. Chapter 2 discusses previous
work in the field of intrusion detection systems and points out their strengths and
weaknesses. Chapter 3 presents attack representation techniques and description
of U2R and R2U attacks. Chapter 4 presents a short overview of the theory of
Hidden Markov Models and multihypothesis testing. It presents the algorithm
used for detection and classification of intrusions and its application for detecting
buffer overflow attacks. Chapter 5 presents results of applying our algorithm
to monitoring data and Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, contributions and




This section presents some background in the area of intrusion detection. The
first section analyzes anomaly detection systems and their performance. It gives
a short overview of statistical methods for anomaly detection, predictive pattern
generation for anomaly detection and program-based anomaly detection. The
second section presents an overview of misuse detection techniques: language-
based misuse detection, expert systems and high-level state machines for misuse
detection. The third section presents an overview of specification-based ap-
proaches to intrusion detection: process, behavior monitoring and process state
analysis. The last section presents the ”attack tree” approach of modeling at-
tacks.
Each of the subsections gives a short overview of the technique of interest and
then presents the data set used. At the end of each section a table comparing the
main features of all methods is presented. The features presented in these tables
are: approach, database of normal present/not present, profiles, rules, events,
signatures, data set and type of classification.
This overview puts more weight to the approach presented in this thesis since
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it is the first attempt to detect the abnormality and classify it as a specific attack
(ffbconfig, eject, fdformat or ps).
2.1 Anomaly Detection
2.1.1 Statistical Methods for Anomaly Detection
In statistical methods for anomaly detection the system observes the activity
of subjects and generates profiles to represent their behavior, where a profile
includes such measures as activity intensity measures, audit record distribution
measures, categorical measures (the distribution of an activity over categories)
and ordinal measure (such as CPU usage). Two profiles are maintained for each
subject: the current profile and the stored profile. As the records are processed,
the system updates the current profile and periodically calculates a measure of
the activity’s abnormality by comparing the current with the stored profile using
a function of abnormality of all measures within the profile. The stored profile
is periodically updated by merging it with the current profile.
Disadvantages of statistical methods are: some methods can be trained by
a skilled attacker to accept abnormal behavior as normal, it can be difficult
to determine thresholds that balance the likelihood of false positives with the
likelihood of missing intrusive events, need accurate statistical distributions. Not
all behaviors can be modeled using purely statistical methods, most techniques
require the assumption of a quasi-stationary process, which is not always the




Haystack [13] is an example of a statistical anomaly-based IDS. It uses both user
and group-based anomaly detection. It models system parameters as indepen-
dent, Gaussian random variables. Parameters are considered as abnormal when
they fall out of 90% of the data range for the variable. It maintains a database
of user groups and individual profiles. If a user has not previously been detected,
a new user profile with minimal capabilities is created using restrictions based
on the user’s group membership. It is designed to detect six types of intrusions:
attempted break-ins by unauthorized users, masquerade attacks, penetration of
the security control system, leakage, DoS attacks and malicious use.
Bayesian classification
Bayesian classification automatically determines the most probable number of
classes for the data, continuous and discrete measures can be freely mixed. On
the other hand, this approach does not take into account the interdependence of
the measures, it is unclear whether the algorithm can perform classification in-
crementally as needed for on-line processing, suffers from difficulty to determine
thresholds, susceptibility to be trained by a skillful attacker etc.
2.1.2 Predictive Pattern Generation for Anomaly Detec-
tion
Predictive pattern generation for anomaly detection takes into account the rela-
tionship and ordering between events. It assumes that events are not random,
but follow a distinguishable pattern. Such methods learn to predict future ac-
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tivities based on the most recent sequence of events and flag events that deviate
significantly from the predicted.
Machine learning
T. Lane and C. Brodley applied the machine learning approach to anomaly de-
tection in [14]. They built user profiles based on input sequences and compared
current input sequences to stored profiles using a similarity measure. To form a
user profile, the approach learns characteristic sequences of actions generated by
users. For learning patterns of actions the system uses the sequence as the unit
of comparison. A sequence is defined as an ordered, fixed-length set of tempo-
rally adjacent actions, where actions consist of UNIX shell commands and their
arguments. To characterize user behavior they used only positive examples. For
the purpose of classification, sequences of new actions are classified as consistent
or inconsistent in reference to sequence history using a similarity measure. To
classify the attack, they classify the similarity of each input sequence, yielding a
stream of similarity measures. If the mean value of the current window is greater
than the threshold then it is classified as normal.
DATA SET
The data used in the experiments consisted of a set of UNIX shell command
histories from four members of the Purdue lab in a four month period. They
compared the specific user to other users and calculated the similarity measure.
Time-based inductive generalization
Teng, Chen and Lu [15] developed a technique that applies a time-based induc-
tive learning approach to security audit trail analysis. The system developed
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sequential rules. The technique uses time-based inductive engine to generate
rule-based patterns that characterize the normal behavior of users. Each event
is one single entry in the audit trail and is described in terms of a number of
attributes (event type, image name, object name, object type, privileges used,
status of execution, process ID, etc). The events in the audit trail are considered
to be sequentially related. Rules identify common sequences of events and the
probability of each sequence being followed by other events. Rules with a high
level of accuracy and high confidence are kept, less useful rules are dropped.
They define two types of anomaly detection: deviation detection and detec-
tion of unrecognized activities. Low probability events are also flagged, using a
threshold. Anomaly is detected if either deviation or unrecognized activity are
detected.
This method can identify the relevant security items as suspicious rather
than the entire login session and it can detect some anomalies that are difficult
to detect with traditional approaches. It’s highly adaptive to changes, can detect
users who try to train the system, activities can be detected and reported within
seconds. On the other hand, some unrecognized patterns might not be flagged
since the initial, predicting portion of the rule may be matched.
2.1.3 Program-based Anomaly Detection
Program modeling
The program modeling approach (Garth Barbour Ph.D. thesis [16]) presents an
algorithm that efficiently learns the program behavior. The author claims that
the number of false positives never increases with additional training. If there is a
false positive, the representation can learn to accept the run in the future without
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negatively impacting the performance of other runs. He also claims that his
technique can detect novel attacks as they occur, without manual specification
of program behavior or attack signatures. His algorithm learns an approximation
of the program’s behavior. The number of false positives decreases with training
set size. He uses a non-statistical method since statistical methods would miss
minor deviations.
Barbour presents an algorithm that learns program behavior, without any
input parameters presented in addition to his algorithm, which would add more
reliability to his results. Input parameters may add additional reliability to
detection because in programs with significant number of system calls, we may
have different arguments associated with those system calls. If a program with
limited capabilities is observed, it does not generate too many different system
calls and, hence it is easy to detect any misuse of that program. On the other
hand, if we are dealing with a powerful program, it generates a significant number
of system calls and therefore, it is more difficult to detect misuse of that program.
DATA SETS
He initially claimed that his algorithm outperforms other algorithms on DARPA/LL,
UNM and his own artificially generated set. However, the final results do not
show any comparison with the UNM data and DARPA/LL data set shows that
the work of Ghosh [26] outperformed the Program Modeling approach.
Computational Immunology
Stephanie Forrest is investigating anomaly detection on system processes from
the perspective of immunology [17, 18, 19]. In [17] the authors base their ap-
proach on the immunological mechanism of distinguishing self from non-self and
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use lookahead pairs. They take short sequences of system calls, called n-grams,
that represent samples of normal runs of programs and compare them to se-
quences of system calls made by a test program. If any run has a number
of mismatches that is higher than a certain number (percent), it is flagged as
anomalous. They extended their work to variable length sequences, based on
random generation of examples of invalid network traffic to detect anomalous
behavior. Unlike Barbour [16], where there is no delay in detecting anomalies,
the approach of Forrest has a certain delay due to the fact that the program
computes the percent mismatch to be able to flag or not flag the run as anoma-
lous. Hofmeyr [18] used the rule of r contiguous bits and showed that fixed
length sequences give better discrimination than lookahead pairs.
Christina Warrender [19] modelled normal behavior of data sets described
below using stide, t-stide, RIPPER and HMMs. She compared learning methods
for application to n-grams: enumerating sequences using lookahead pairs and
contiguous sequences, methods based on relative frequency of different sequences,
RIPPER (a rule-learning system) and HMMs. They used RIPPER to learn rules
representing the set of n-grams. Training samples consisted of set of attributes
describing the object to be classified and a target class to which the object
belongs. RIPPER takes training samples and forms a list of rules to describe
normal sequences. For each rule a violation score is established. Each set that
violates a high confidence rule is a mismatch. They created HMMs so that
there is one state for each n-gram. The results showed that HMMs performed
marginally better than other methods. She showed that HMMs performed only
marginally better than other simple and not computationally expensive methods
and concluded that the choice of data stream (short sequences of system calls)
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was more important than the particular method of analysis.
DATA SETS
In [17] and [18] synthetic data sets were used. They were generated in production
environment by running a prepared script. Warrender [19] collected traces of
programs collected during normal usage and used only those programs that run
with privilege due to the fact that misuse of privileged programs does the most
harm to the system. She used lpr, named, xlock, login and ps. Data for
lpr was collected at two universities using different printing environments. The
named normal data consists of a single daemon trace and traces of its subprocesses
and the intrusion against named is buffer overflow. They used two sample traces
of buffer overflow attack. Data for xlock includes 71 synthetic traces and one
live trace. The intrusion used was a buffer overflow. For login and ps they used
two Trojan programs.
Variable-length audit trail patterns
Wespi [23] points out that usage of fixed-length patterns to represent the process
model in [17] has no rule for selecting the optimal pattern length. On the other
hand, Forrest et.al. [18, 19] point out that the pattern length has an influence
on the detection capabilities of the IDS. Wespi et.al. initially were not able to
prove significant advantage of variable-length patterns in [21]. Later, in [23] they
showed that the previously stated method outperforms the method of Forrest
et. al [18, 19]. They use functionality verification test (FVT) suites provided by
application developers to generate a training set based on the normal program’s
specified behaviors. Their system consists of an off-line and on-line part. In the
next step they apply the Teiresias algorithm [22] to generate the list of maximal
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variable-length patterns followed by some pruning during their preprocessing.
During operation, a recursive pattern matching algorithm attempts to find the
best matches for the test run. The measure of anomaly is the longest sequence
of unmatched events (more than six consecutive unmatched events are treated
as an intrusion).
Initial work generated variable-length patterns using a suffix-tree construc-
tor, a pattern pruner, and a pattern selector. ID based on this technique can
detect the attacks but is prone to issue false alarms. Then they used a modified
version of the pattern generator to create variable-length patterns that reduce
the number of false alarms substantially without reducing the ability to detect
intrusions.
The technique presented in the initial paper had the weakness of not having
a model for intrusion. Because of that reason, the advantages of the Teiresias
algorithm were of no use and the performance was only marginally better than
the methods of Stephanie Forrest.
The authors claim that their algorithm performs better than the fixed-length
sequences of Stephanie Forrest, but they compare their algorithm only for the
ftpd process and then claim that their algorithm outperforms algorithms pre-
sented in [17, 18]. This is arguable because it might be the case that they
presented one example where their algorithm outperformed the other algorithms
and did not present the instances where their algorithm failed. Hence, we can
conclude that on that specific process algorithm of Wespi et. al. [23] did out-
perform the algorithm of Forrest et. al. [17, 18] but, on the other hand, that
may or may not be true for other processes.
DATA SET
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Wespi et. al. set up their own test environment and did not use DARPA/LL
data set.
Multiple length N-grams
C. Marceau [20] reviewed the work of Forrest et.al. [18] and their N-gram char-
acterization of sequences of system calls. She proposed an alternative character-
ization in the form of a Finite State Machine whose states represent predictive
sequences of different lengths. An algorithm that constructs an FSM from train-
ing data is presented. In the presented approach the author first constructs a
suffix tree for N-grams of the training data for some value of N that is large
enough (small values of N lead to false negatives and large values of N increase
training time). Then a suffix tree is converted to a DAG by merging equivalent
subtrees. The result is a set of strings of varying length that is equivalent to the
original set of N-grams. The contribution of the paper is that they show how to
derive a FSM implementation of the sliding window algorithm presented in pa-
pers of Forrest et.al. [18] and reduce the size of data sets (177 strings and 1062
symbols from Forrest database are equivalent to 131 strings and 318 symbols
from Marceau database).
DATA SETS
The author used lpr training data and exploits from UNM data set, inetd
training data and exploits from UNM data set and data from the PersonalTracker
applications collected by the CORBA Immune System. The CORBA Immune




Kosoresow [24] analyzed the structure of system call traces for normal and
anomalous behavior. The audit trail used consists of traces of system calls exe-
cuted by privileged processes. The parameters for each system call are ignored
and the name of the call is replaced with a unique number. From that sequence
they build a database of normal behaviors for each process. He counted the
mismatches within small, fixed-length sections of the trace - locality frames. The
frames were about 20 system calls long. In each position of the frame he counted
the number of system calls that generated the mismatch. He observed that mis-
matches occur close together, which lead him to the conclusion that only short
sequences of system calls are needed for detection. The other observation was
that long sequences of system calls were consistently repeated, which lead him to
use a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) and its corresponding regular lan-
guage. He constructed a DFA using manually selected macros (variable-length
patterns of system calls). He divided the trace into the prefix, main and suf-
fix portion and found the longest common prefixes and suffixes for each of the
categories and looked for frequently occurring strings. He then substituted the
strings for the macros and built a DFA from these letters. After applying this
algorithm, out of 147 sendmail processes only 26 distinct processes were left.
The disadvantages of his approach were that he created DFA using scripts
and by hand, which is not efficient and does not scale well to real systems.
That leads to the conclusion that an exact DFA representation is not possible.
Also, calculating macros based on the minimal description of the normal trace
is potentially NP-hard. The observation that mismatches occur in occasional
bursts does not hold for stealthy attacks.
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DATA SET
Kosoresow used UNM data set.
Fast-automation based method
R. Sekar et.al. introduced a fast-automation based method for detecting anoma-
lous program behaviors [25]. They criticize the approach of Forrest et.al. [17]
because small values of N lead to the possibility of not capturing all behaviors
and missing attacks. They take the Finite State Automaton (FSA) approach
to the problem since an FSA can capture an infinite number of sequences of
arbitrary length using finite storage. The authors claim that their FSA repre-
sentation leads to performance better than the one in Forrest et.al. [17]. Their
approach has the property that it learns faster, has better detection, false posi-
tive rate drops, presents large sets of execution traces in a compact way and has
faster detection. Their learning algorithm is based on tracing the system calls
made by a process under normal execution. In addition to system call names,
they obtain the value of program counter (PC) as well since each value of the
PC corresponds to a different state of the FSA. For each system call they obtain
the corresponding location from where the call was made, check if there exists a
transition from the current state to the new state that is labeled with the system
call name that was intercepted (if not, there is an anomaly) and finally update
the state of the automaton to correspond to the new state. The authors show
that their algorithm converges quickly, false positive rate of the FSA algorithm
is low and space and runtime overhead of FSA-learning is minimal.
DATA SET
Sekar et.al. [25] used ftpd, httpd, nsfd and telnetd programs and compared
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their approach to the N-gram approach on that data set. They compared the
algorithms with respect to convergence of learning, false positive rate, runtime
and space overhead and attack detection efficiency. They also compared the
results using a live Web server. They argue that their system is able to detect
almost all buffer overflow attacks, Trojan Horse and other code changes, mali-
ciously crafted input, dictionary or password guessing attacks and DoS attacks.
The FSA-based approach cannot detect attacks that involve system call argu-
ment values, race conditions (and other attacks that do not change behavior of
attacked program) and certain classes of attacks launched with knowledge of the
intrusion detection techniques being used.
Program Behavior Profiles
The work of Ghosh et. al. [26] is based on the work of the UNM group. The goal
of their approach was to employ machine learning techniques that can generalize
from past behavior so that they are able to detect new attacks and reduce the
false positive rate. The first approach they used was equality matching. The
database used was the normal behavior of programs. Instead of using strace,
they use BSM data to collect the system call information and collect them into
fixed size windows. They used the fact that the attacks cause anomalous be-
havior in clusters, like Kosoresow in [24]. Their decision choice looks for local
clustering of the mismatches. The second model was the feed-forward topology
with backpropagation learning rules. Database was not on per-user basis like
in [14], but they built profiles of software behavior and malicious software be-
havior. During training many networks were trained for each program and the
network that performed the best was selected. The training process consisted
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of exposing networks to four weeks of labeled data and performing backprop-
agation algorithm to adjust weights. They trained Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN) to recognize whether small, fixed sequences of events are characteristic
of the programs in which they occur. For each sequence, the ANN produces an
output value that represents how anomalous the sequence is. The leaky bucket
algorithm was used to classify the program behavior and using leaky bucket they
made use of the rule that two close anomalies have higher influence than when
they are apart. The final approach was Elman network, developed by Jeffrey
Elman, since they wanted to add information about the prior sequences (DFA
approach lacked flexibility and ANNs have the ability to learn and generalize).
In order to generalize they employ a recurrent ANN topology of an Elman net-
work. They train the network to predict the next sequence that will occur at any
point in time. The Elman network approach had the best results, with 77.3%
detection and no false positives and 100% detection and fewer false positives
than in two other cases.
They also tried two approaches in which they used FSMs for their represen-
tation. Audit data was condensed into a stream of discrete events, where events
are system calls recorded in data. Separate automata are constructed for differ-
ent programs whose audit data are available for training. The training algorithm
is presented with a series of n−grams taken from non-intrusive BSM data for
a given program. The audit data is split into sub-sequences of size n + l (n
elements define a state and l elements are used to label a transition coming out
of that state). The second FA-like approach, called a string transducer makes
an attempt to detect subtler statistical deviations from normal behavior. It as-
sociates a sequence of input symbols with a series of output symbols. During
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training they estimate the probability distribution of the symbols at each state
and during testing, deviations from this probability distribution indicate anoma-
lous behavior. They use FA whose states correspond to n−grams in the BSM
data. For each state they also record information about successor l−grams that
are observed in the training data. During training their goal is to gather statis-
tics about successor l−grams. They estimate the probability of each l−gram by
counting.
DATA SETS
They used 1998 and 1999 DARPA/LL datasets. They used twelve weeks of train-
ing data from Lincoln Labs. They also used some additional data from Johns
Hopkins University and they collected data for eject, fdformat and xterm on
their own system. The data contained probes, DoS attacks, unauthorized ac-
cesses and unauthorized privilege elevations. The results show that under 94%
of the attacks were detected. However, they did not include the attacks that did
not misuse existing programs, meaning that the actual detection rate is much
smaller.
2.1.4 Anomaly detection using data mining
The ADAM (Audit Data Analysis and Mining) system [30] is an anomaly de-
tection system. It uses a module that classifies the suspicious events into false
alarms or real attacks. It uses data mining to build a customizable profile of
rules of normal behavior and then classifies attacks (by name) or declares false
alarms. ADAM is a real-time system. To discover attacks in TCPdump audit
trail, ADAM uses a combination of association rules, mining and classification.
The system builds a repository of normal frequent itemsets that hold during
27
attack-free periods. Then it runs a sliding window online algorithm that finds
frequent item sets in the last D connections and compares them with those stored
in the normal item set repository. With the rest, ADAM uses a classifier which
has previously been trained to classify the suspicious connections as a known
type of attack, unknown type or a false alarm. Association rules are used to
gather necessary knowledge about the nature of the audit data. They derive a
set of rules in form X → Y , where X and Y are sets of attributes. There are two
parameters associated with a rule: support s and confidence c. The definitions
of s and c are as follows. The rule x → Y has support s in the transition set T if
s% of transactions in T contain X or Y. The rule x → Y has confidence c if c%
of transactions in T that contain X also contain Y. If the item set’s support sur-
passes a threshold, that item set is reported as suspicious. The system annotates
suspicious item sets with a vector of parameters. Since the system knows where
the attacks are in the training set, the corresponding suspicious item set along
with their feature vectors are used to train a classifier. The trained classifier will
be able to, given a suspicious item set and a vector of features, classify it as a
known attack (and label it with the name of attack), as an unknown attack or
a false alarm.
DATA SET
ADAM was one out of 7 systems tested in the 1999 DARPA evaluation. In
overall evaluation it performed about the same as EMERALD and better than
all other systems. It was focused mainly on detecting DoS attacks and probes.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2.1 Language-based Misuse Detection
Language-based Misuse Detection systems accept a description of the intrusions
in a formal language and use this to monitor for the intrusions. Most languages
for misuse systems, including the one used by NIDES, are low-level and have
limited expressiveness.
ASAX
Habra et. al. define Advanced Security audit trail Analysis for universal audit
trail analysis [32]. ASAX (Advanced Security audit trail Analysis on uniX) uses
RUSSEL, a rule-based language, specifically appropriate for audit trail analysis.
ASAX sequentially analyzes records using a collection of rules that are applied
to each audit record. A subset of rules is active at any time. They define a
normalized audit data format (NADF) as a canonical format of the Operating
System’s audit trail.
2.2.2 Expert Systems
Expert systems use lists of conditions that, if satisfied, indicate that an intrusion
is taking place. The conditions are rules that are evaluated based on system or
network events. These rules are specified by experts familiar with the intrusions,
generally working closely with the developers of the system.
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2.2.3 High-level state machines for misuse detection
The State Transition Analysis Tool (STAT)[33] describes computer pen-
etrations as attack scenarios. It represents attacks as a sequence of actions
that cause transitions that lead from a safe state to a compromised state. A
state represents a snapshot of the system’s security-relevant properties that are
characterized by means of assertions, which are predicates on some aspects of
the security state of the system. The initial state of a transition diagram does
not have any assertions. Each state transition diagram starts with a signature
action that triggers monitoring of the intrusion scenario. Transitions between
states are labelled by the actions required to switch from one state to another.
These actions do not necessarily correspond to audit records. The resulting state
transition diagram forms the basis of a rule-based intrusion detection algorithm.
USTAT [34] is an implementation of the STAT tool developed for Solaris BSM.
It reads specifications of the state transitions necessary to complete an intrusion
and evaluates an audit trail. Two preconditions must be met to use USTAT:
the intrusion must have a visible effect on the system state and the visible effect
must be recognizable without knowing the attacker’s true identity.
STATL [35] is a language that allows description of computer penetrations
as sequences of actions that an attacker performs to compromise a computer
system. The attack is modelled as a sequence of steps that bring a system from
an initial safe state to a final compromised state. An attack is represented as a
set of states and transitions, where each transition has an associated action. The
notion of timers is used to express attacks in which some events must happen
with an interval following some other event (set of events). Times are declared
as variables using the built-in type timer. STAT can detect cooperative attacks
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and attacks that span multiple user sessions, can specify rules at higher level than
audit records, is easier to create and maintain than other rule-based methods,
can represent a partial ordering among actions, can represent longer scenarios
than other rule-based systems. On the other hand, it has no general-purpose
mechanism to prune partial matches of attacks other than assertion primitives
built into the model.
DATA SETS
USTAT and NetSTAT were tested in the 1998 DARPA/LL off-line intrusion
detection evaluation and the 1998 AFRL real time evaluation.
2.2.4 EMERALD
EMERALD (Event monitoring enabling responses to anomalous live distur-
bances) [31] employs both anomaly and misuse detection. It includes service
analysis that covers the misuse of individual components and network services
within a single domain, domain-wide analysis that covers misuse visible across
multiple services and components and enterprise-wide analysis that covers co-
ordinated misuse across multiple domains. They also introduce the notion of
service monitors that provide localized analysis of infrastructure and services.
EMERALD consists of three analysis units: profiler engines, signature engines
and resolver. Profiler engine performs statistical profile-based anomaly detec-
tion given a generalized event stream of an analysis target. Signature engine
requires minimal state management and employs a rule-coding scheme. The
profiler and signature engines receive large volumes of event logs and produce a
smaller volume of intrusion/suspicion reports and send that data to the resolver.
The signature analysis subsystem allows administrators to instantiate a rule set
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customized to detect known problem activity occurring on the analysis target.
2.3 Specification-based approaches to Intrusion
Detection
In specification-based approaches we don’t need to specify signatures for known
attacks, but we can instead specify known properties that should hold true in a
valid execution. This approach is user insensitive, requiring manual specification
of program behaviors.
2.3.1 Specification of legal activities
Ko et.al. [27] developed an approach using specifications of legal activities for
security critical programs to verify program execution. They aim to detect ex-
ploitations of vulnerabilities in privileged programs by monitoring their execu-
tion using audit trails. The monitoring is with respect to specifications of the
security-relevant behavior of the programs. Their approach involves the writing
of specifications of legal activities for privileged programs and the use of these
specifications to verify program execution. The specification language is based
on predicate logic and regular expressions. The language alphabet consists of a
set of operation predicate symbols OP , a set of attribute symbols At for each
type t ∈ T (T is the set of object types) and a set of state variable symbols S.
The body of a program policy specification is a list of rules that characterize
the set of parameter values allowed for each operation.
DATA SETS
Ko et. al. use a few attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in Unix privileged
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programs: rdist, finger daemon and sendmail.
2.3.2 Process Behavior Monitoring
R. Sekar [28] has presented an alternate approach to specification-based intru-
sion detection. This approach uses a domain-specific language called behavioral
monitoring specification language (BMSL). BMSL consists of rules in the form
pat → action, where pat is a pattern on event sequences and actions specifies
the responses when the observed history satisfies pat.
They developed generic specifications (grouped system calls of similar func-
tionality), refined the generic specifications for setuid programs and daemon
processes. Then they developed application-specific specifications for FTP and
telnet servers and added site-specific security policies to these specifications.
DATA SET
1999 DARPA/AFRL online evaluation, 1999 DARPA/LL offline evaluation data
and several locally developed experiments were used. They could detect 80% of
the attacks using specifications that characterized legitimate program behaviors.
They describe how their system was able to detect buffer overflows, ftp-write
attack, warez attack, guess telnet, guest and HTTPtunnel attacks. They claim
that no false alarms were reported by their method on the BSM data.
2.3.3 Process State Analysis
Nuansri et. al. [29] analyzed the pattern of system calls of a process, so that later
the tracing technique could be used for an intrusion detection method. They used
ktrace() system call to trace process activities. The tracing function reports
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all system calls used in a traced process as well as their arguments and return
values, an error number and an error message (if they exist). They classified the
user attributes into states, where state is described by a 4-tuple: real user ID,
effective user ID, real group ID and effective group ID. States can be normal,
special privileged and superuser states. The authors created a state transition
diagram representing changes in process privilege where illegal transitions were
used to create a set of rules (five rules) for use in intrusion detection.
This intrusion detection technique has a delay in detection because the ktrace()
writes into a file which is then read by the intrusion detection system.
Table 2.3 represents the overview of presented Specification-based techniques.
All classification methods are based on Normal/Abnormal classification.
2.4 Other approaches
2.4.1 Attack graph/tree approach
Automated generation and analysis
Sheyner et. al. [36] adopted the attack graph approach to attack detection. The
whole process has three steps: modeling the network, producing the attack graph
and analyzing the attack graph. They model the network as a FSM, where state
transitions correspond to atomic attacks. They produce the attack graph using
the model checker NuSMV [37]. Since the attack graph produced that way is a
low level state transition diagram they parse the graph and reconstruct the origi-
nal meanings of the state variables as they relate to the network intrusion. They
model the network as a set of facts, each represented as a relational predicate.










































































































































































































































































































































tween hosts and a remote login trust relation. They suppose that the intruder
has knowledge about the target network and its users, such as knowledge about
host addresses, known vulnerabilities, information about running services, etc.
Each node in the attack graph is labelled by an attack ID number (corresponds
to the atomic attack to be attempted next), a flag that indicates whether the
attack is stealthy or detectable and the numbers of the source and target hosts.
As the authors claim, the bottleneck of their approach is the graph creation
procedure since it took two hours to create a graph that had 3 hosts and eight
attacks.
DATA SETS




Attack representation and modelling
In this section we demonstrate that attacks have regular behavior that can be
easily captured in four to five transitions. We present attack trees and their
properties as means to model broad classes of network attacks. Comparing
the transition diagrams of normal and malicious sequences we conclude that
distinguishing among normal and malicious sequences is possible and can be
done using as data sequences of system calls with information about payload
size and shell execution and methods from detection theory.
This chapter presents also applications of attack tree models specifically to
attacks exploiting buffer overflow attacks and of one Remote to Local attack. The
model for ftp-write attack could not be applied for detection and classification
due to lack of data. In this chapter we also present a description of race condition
attacks. From that description we draw the conclusion that it is possible to detect
and classify race condition attacks using our approach. The main goal of this
thesis (as stated earlier) is to present efficient attack models and demonstrate
their use for high performance detection and classification of attacks. Due to
lack of attack data for other attacks we have shown results of application of
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our methods to attacks that exploit buffer overflows. To emphasize again, the
main focus of this thesis is not modelling and detecting of buffer overflows, but
modelling and detecting of broad classes of network attacks.
We are aware of the existence of tools for static code checking that are efficient
in detecting buffer overflows and other attacks [43, 44, 42]. However, those tools
have high false positive rates (up to 75%) and produce some false negatives
(miss some attacks). Those tools are highly efficient if applied during the code
development phase but it is not possible to apply them to already existing codes
(or is very difficult to apply them). They also need implementation of certain
rules and they demand a change in the code itself. Hence, it is possible to use
them in the future and if used consistently they would significantly reduce the
number of attacks that appear. The facts, however, show that only about 15%
of code developers use programs that check code for possible errors like buffer
overflows etc. and that proves that there is a need for dynamic (or on-line)
Intrusion Detection systems now and in the future even for attacks that exploit
buffer overflows. The need for IDS for attacks that exploit buffer overflows would
be greatly reduced if all program developers used both static and dynamic code
testing for buffer overflows.
In [42] the authors present a lightweight static analysis tool for static analysis.
The tool is used for checking codes written in ANSI C. They show that the
program generates both false positives and false negatives, meaning that it misses
some of the attacks and also misclassifies normal behavior for anomalous. Their
tool is based on reporting all suspicious commands like, for example, gets etc.
Finally, the tool they introduced has extremely high false positive rate. Running
the tool on wu-ftpd 2.5 produced 101 warnings. Out of those warnings, only 25
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represented real buffer overflow attacks. Hence, the tool had FA rate around
75%. The authors claim that ”although static analysis is important approach
to security it is not a panacea. It does not replace runtime access controls,
systematic testing and careful security assessments”.
Another paper that presents a technique for detecting potential buffer over-
flows by static analysis was written by David Wagner et. al [43]. Their approach
involves synthesis of ideas from several fields, including program analysis, theory
and systems security. They formulate the buffer overrun detection problem as an
integer constraint problem and they use some simple graph-theoretic techniques
to construct an efficient algorithm for solving the integer constraints. The tool
the authors present produces both false positives and false negatives. The au-
thors define the number of false negatives the tool produces as limitations of the
tool and say that ”a human must still devote significant time to checking each
potential buffer overrun”. Hence, this version of the tool finds many of buffer
overflows in tested programs but also misses some of them and there still exists
a significant need for human presence.
David Wagner and Hao Chen present MOPS - MOdel Checking Programs
for Security Properties in [44]. They identify rules of safe programming practice,
encode them as safety properties and verify whether these properties are obeyed.
The program to be modelled is represented as a pushdown automaton and the
security property is represented as a Finite State Automaton. This tool also has
high false alarm rate. There were no reports of False Negatives in this tool. The
results are obtained on well known applications like wu-ftpd and sendmail.
In summary, if the static analysis tools are used for detection of buffer over-
flows they will detect the majority of attacks, but may also miss them. Every-
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thing is done under a high FA cost (around 75%). Those tools cannot detect
other types of attacks successfully and there emerges a need for use of dynamic
intrusion detection systems. In order to use static analysis tools efficiently all
programmers have to use them when developing the code or re-apply the analysis
tools to their already existing programs. That is infeasible and hence the need
for dynamic intrusion detection systems still exists.
In this chapter we first give the definition of attack trees, then we describe
each of the attack using the attack trees and finally we argue in support of
the claim that attack trees are useful for understanding attacks but may not
be appropriate as a main tool for attack detection. Then we present each of
the attacks in the condensed form, containing only the states, transitions and
parameters that characterize those attacks.
3.1 Attack representation
An attack tree [40, 41] is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with a set of nodes
and associated sets of system calls for those nodes. Attack trees provide a formal,
methodical way of describing the security of systems, based on various attacks.
They give a description of possible sets of subactions that an attacker needs to
fulfill in order to achieve a goal and bring the network to an unsafe state [41].
We represent attacks against the system in tree structure where the goal is to
compromise the root node. Different ways of achieving the goals are represented
in the form of leaf nodes. Each node/state has some associated memory and
represents a goal towards achieving the final result. The values stored in the
nodes should have the ability to update themselves with the new information
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about attacks. If we associate each edge in the tree with some probability/weight
as weight=f(configuration, attacker profile) then this information should be up-
dated with new attacks. The individual goals can be achieved as sets of OR and
AND sets of actions and subactions. Subactions are actions of the attacker that
he needs to fulfill in order to achieve his goal (for example, in order to create
a stealthy attack the attacker has to interleave some “normal” sequences of ac-
tions). The real challenge in constructing attack trees is that we must assume
different levels of skills of the attackers, try to predict different paths of intru-
sions and evaluate costs of attacks. States are defined as actions performed by an
attacker at a certain time. Transitions are caused by changes to a current state.
We can further describe transitions by the property that transition from state n
to state n+1 corresponds to an attack whose preconditions are satisfied in state
n and whose postconditions hold in state n + 1. Each transition involves the
application of an operation that takes the stored value and input and generates
output and a new value for the stored value. Using this notation we can describe
an attack as a sequence of transitions that ends with the action of the attacker
compromising the security of the system. Each node is a rule or a set of rules
that gives us information about how the intruder can influence the network.
We have a malicious user who executes system calls in certain order to at-
tempt to break in the computer system. The major problem is that in most
cases of high-level attacks those sequences of system calls can be interleaved
within normal system behavior in numerous ways. Our goal is to detect when
a particular sequence of harmful instructions that could compromise security of
our system has been performed. Though the distributed nature of these mea-
surements is very important (as when an attack unfolds), we ignore it at present.
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We need to represent a program as an attack tree, with goals and transition
probabilities, as defined in [41] in the following way:
1. Create an attack tree representation where each node is a subgoal towards
reaching the desired goal and each edge is labeled with the system calls
made by the monitored program.
2. Estimate the attack tree in a probabilistic manner based on system calls
made by the program.
3. Generate a database of actions from the given attack tree and convert
those actions in a set of HMMs, where each HMM is trained to recognize
the attack pattern from which it was generated.
4. Use the current state to rule out actions of the attacker with unmatched
preconditions.
5. The IDS system performs pattern matching of HMMs and possible se-
quences of the attack and produces a score for each of the patterns.
6. Use the obtained scores to find the likelihoods of the attacker’s actions
that were generated.
7. Use the obtained data to determine if the program is being attacked.
The first step in analyzing the tree is to determine the set of states that
are reachable from the initial state and find the unsafe states (paths that lead
to compromising the state of the system). The first transition in the attack
tree picks a subset of attacks that the intruder might use based on the set
of preconditions. Each node in the level lower than the level of the root is a
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subgraph where another subset of attacks is used etc. This leads to the conclusion
that in order to check every possible subset of attacks we need to run the check
exponential number of times to the number of attacks.
3.2 Attack description and modelling
This section includes description of most commonly exploited categories of at-
tacks and equivalent graphs that represent the flow of execution of those at-
tacks. Finally, we define each attack with a sequence of 4-5 system calls and
corresponding arguments. The studied attacks include four instances of User to
Root attacks that exploit buffer overflows and two instances of Remote to Lo-
cal attacks. The attacks studied are: eject, ps, ffbconfig, fdformat and
ftp-write. The data used for attack detection was MIT Lincoln Labs 1998
data set for eject, ffbconfig, fdformat and ftp-write. Although the MIT
Lincoln Labs attack database indicates that ps attack was detected both in 1998
and 1999, the table that contains attacks detected in 1998 does not contain it.
Hence, the 1999 data was used to create a representation of that attack. The
models for all other attacks were created using 1998 data and were also com-
pared against 1999 data. The resulting models that were created from 1998
data could be used for attack detection from the 1999 data set as well and that
verified the correctness of diagrams for 1998 data set. BSM data did not suffice
for detecting ftp-write attack and for that reason both BSM and tcpdump
data were used. BSM data were sufficient for capturing the behavioral pattern
of exploited programs and tcpdump data were used to check whether the user
initially logged in as root or obtained the root access after login. In the former
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case the privilege abuse was due to poor password or unchanged default root
password and in the latter case it was due to the fact that the legal (non-root,
in most cases anonymous) user used a security hole and obtained the root access
after login process. Certain regularities were captured in behavior of exploited
programs by comparing them against:
1. normal instances of those programs,
2. other instances of attacks detected at different periods of time and
3. by searching for certain events in the behavior of a program that were
expected to happen by using the knowledge about the mechanism of those
attacks and their goals.
All attacks except ftp-write had numerous instances that were performed
throughout every week of data capturing which lead to the conclusion of existence
of regularities in behavior. 13 instances of eject attack were captured, 3 instances
of ps attack, 5 instances of ffbconfig attack, 5 instances of format attack and one
instance of ftp-write attack (containing multiple exploits). All those behaviors
completely matched the expected pattern learned by our theoretical approach.
The process of creating a diagram of attacks consisted of the following actions:
the BSM data for specific days that contained the desired attacks were extracted
in the first step. The second step consisted of extracting instances of those
attacks using the program specially created for that purpose. Once the file with
the attack was extracted, we looked at system calls along with their process
numbers. As long as the critical program with the same process number was
executed, we looked at the recorded system calls. When only system calls were
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not sufficient, we looked at the path of program execution (for example, in ftp-
based attacks).
3.2.1 User to Root Attacks
User to Root exploits belong to the class of attacks where the attacker gains the
access to a normal user account on the system and by exploiting some vulner-
ability obtains the root access. As mentioned before, the special class of those
attacks are stealthy attacks that are more difficult to detect. According to MIT
Lincoln Labs description of attacks, stealthy U2R attacks consist of six stages:
encoding, transport, decoding, execution, actions and cleanup.
The most common User to Root attack is buffer overflow attack. Other,
also commonly exploited attacks are loadmodule attack that exploits programs
that make assumptions about the environment in which they are running, race
condition attacks, etc. Some examples of those attacks are eject, ffbconfig,
fdformat, loadmodule, perl, ps, xterm etc. and some of those attacks are
described later in this chapter.
The following examples show that each attack is characterized with a very
simple distinguishing sequence of system calls and accompanying parameters
(like size, PID, path, etc.), which can be used for recognition and identification
of different attacks.
Buffer overflow attacks
The most exploited type of User to Root attacks is the buffer overflow attack,
which enables the attacker to run personal code on a compromised machine once
the boundary of a buffer has been exceeded, giving him the privileges of the
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overflowed program (which in most cases is root). This type of attacks usually
tries to execute a shell with the application’s owner privileges.
A buffer overflow is the result of passing more data into a buffer than it can
handle. As the stack contains not only the variables of vulnerable functions but
also the return addresses for the points from which the functions were called,
overwriting enough data potentially gives the exploit full control over the process.
To achieve execution of exploit code, in most cases it is sufficient to write a shell
code that spawns a shell. When we write or obtain the shellcode we know it
must be part of the string which we are going to use to overflow the buffer. Also,
the return address must point back into the buffer. After that the attacker is
able to execute all other commands from the spawned shell.
Programs written in C are particularly vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks
because C allows direct pointer manipulations without any bounds checking.
Two categories can be recognized: stack and heap based overflows. The
simplest example of buffer overflow vulnerability is stack smashing ([38]), where
the attacker overwrites a buffer on the stack to replace the return address. When
the function returns, instead of jumping to the return address it jumps to the
address that was placed on the stack by the attacker, making the application
execute some arbitrary code. To provide the attacker with the root access, the
application has to run under an ID that’s different from the user’s ID, like suid
or daemon. To be able to execute a buffer overflow attack the attacker needs
a shellcode. The most exploited function for calling a shell is execve(). If
execve() succeeds, the calling program is replaced with the executable code
of the new program and starts. Since the exploit is inserted in the attacked
program we need to exit it as soon as the exploit code executes, which is done
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by using the exit() function.
The steps in executing a buffer overflow expoit can be summarized as follows:
• Fill the array large string[] with the address of buffer[], which is
where the exploit code will be;
• Copy the shellcode into the beginning of the large string string;
• Next, strcpy() copies large string in the buffer without doing bounds
checking. That action results in overflow of the return address, overwriting
it with the address where our code is now located.
• Once we reach the end of main and it tries to return it jumps to the exploit
code, and executes a shell.
The set of actions that lead to a buffer overflow attack can be graphically
presented as shown on figure 3.1.
Eject attack - U2R
According to eject man pages, eject is used for those removable media devices
that do not have a manual eject button, or for those that do, but are managed by
Volume Management. The device may be specified by its name or by a nickname;
if Volume Management is running and no device is specified, the default device
is used.
The eject attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in eject program.
Due to insufficient bound checking on arguments in the volume management
library, libvolmgt.so.1, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the
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        our code will be
C2. Copy SP into FP
                 on web server
Get access to privileged account
Figure 3.1: Buffer Overflow Diagram.
The MIT Lincoln Labs attack database gives some suggestions on how to de-
tect that attack. Assuming that real attackers will not leave strings like “Jump-
ing to address” or similar strings that would make detection trivial we need to
extract certain patterns from traces of eject attack instances and observe all the
regularities. We extracted numerous instances of both normal and anomalous
sequences of eject program and noted regularities in program behavior. We also
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examined one instance of stealthy eject attack and noted the same regularities
in program behavior as in clear instances of that attack. That can be explained
with the fact that the stealthy part of the attack was performed in the login part
and file transport to the exploited machine (i.e. encrypted file, scheduled exploit
execution etc.) The attack traces consist of hundreds or thousands lines of system
calls. However, there are only a couple of system call sequences that are sufficient
to completely define the attack. The resulting state diagram has three states
that uniquely define the attack. There are minor variations in the first stages
of this attack and this resulted in one branch that was added to the diagram.
One transition that enables detection of eject exploit is transition from stat(2)
system call with path /vol/dev/aliases to execve(2), whereas the normal
sequence either does not have the same transition or has transition with valid
path /vol/dev/aliases/DeviceName (for example /vol/dev/aliases/floppy)
to execve(2). The observed path /vol/dev/aliases with no device name af-
ter aliases indicates that the attacker is polling for existence of devices on the
exploited network/machine and the string of stat(2) system calls preceding
execve(2) system call defines the attack. No other attack has this identify-
ing sequence. Another identifying string that characterizes the eject exploit is
usr/bin/eject or existence of string ./ejectexploit or ./eject. Buffer over-
flow is detected by observing large value of header and a sequence of symbols
such as ! @ # $ % &̂ . This may not be the case at all times because a skilled
attacker may use a combination of letters and non-repeating patterns instead of
repeating a short sequence of patterns.
The diagram of eject attack is presented on figure 3.2.
Another serious problem in attack detection is globbing which is used to avoid
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Figure 3.2: Eject attack.
detection of suspicious commands. For example, instead of typing command
/bin/cat/etc/passwd the attacker will use /[r,s,t,b]?[l,w,n,m]/[c,d]?t
/?t[c,d,e]/*a?s*. The shell will replace the glob characters and will find
that the only valid match for this string is /bin/cat/etc/passwd. None of the
attacks from MIT dataset had examples of globbing.
Ffbconfig - U2R
The ffbconfig program configures the Creator Fast Frame Buffer (FFB)Graphics
Accelerator, which is part of the FFB Configuration Software Package, SUNWff-
bcf. This software is used when the FFB Graphics accelerator card is installed.
Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments, it is possible to overwrite the
internal stack space of the ffbconfig program.
This attack is another example of a buffer overflow attack that has signature
very similar to the signature of eject attack. There is one state less in the equiv-
alent representation than in the state diagram constructed for eject attack. The
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state that does not characterize ffbconfig exploit is stat(2) with undefined pa-
rameters. The sequence that defines this exploit is /usr/sbin/ffbconfig with
oversized -dev parameter and ./ffbconfig or ./ffb or some other sequence
that executes the exploit.
The equivalent state diagram is represented on Figure 3.3.
2 3 4 51
2. Ffbconfig program starts,
    loading libraries
1. Start
3. Buffer overflow finished
4. Shell executed
5. Child process created
exitexecve execve
1−>2: ./ffbconfig
2−>3: large header and
3−>4: shell execution: /usr/bin/ksh
 execution of 
/usr/bin/ffbconfig
4−>5: pipe, fork
Figure 3.3: Ffbconfig attack.
Fdformat - U2R
fdformat attack is another example of buffer overflow attack. The Fdformat at-
tack exploits a buffer overflow in the ’fdformat’ program distributed with Solaris
2.5. The fdformat program formats diskettes and PCMCIA memory cards. The
program also uses the same volume management library, libvolmgt.so.1, and is
exposed to the same vulnerability as the eject program.
This exploit is almost identical to ffbconfig attack. The only differences are
in the path of the attack which is in this case /usr/bin/fdformat and in the file
that is executed (if it is named by the attack) ./formatexploit or ./format.
The equivalent state diagram is represented on Figure 3.4
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1. Start
3. Buffer overflow finished
4. Shell executed
5. Child process created
    loading libraries
2. Fdformat program starts,
exitexecve execve
2−>3: large header and
1−>2: ./fdformat
         creating a child process
4−>5: creating a pipe and
3−>4: shell execution: /usr/bin/ksh
 execution of 
/usr/bin/fdformat
Figure 3.4: Fdformat attack.
Ps attack - U2R
The typical form of ps attack involves both buffer overflow and race condition.
The instances of ps attacks given in the MIT Lincoln Labs data set contain
ps attacks that contain buffer overflow without race condition. This section
contains the description of the ps attack that contains both buffer overflow and
race condition. Finally the ps attack that is executed using only buffer overflow
is described and represented with an equivalent state diagram.
The ps attack takes advantage of a race condition in the version of ’ps’
distributed with Solaris 2.5 and allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code
with root privilege. This race condition can only be exploited in order to gain
root access if the user has access to the temporary files. Access to temporary
files may be obtained if the permissions on the /tmp and /var/tmp directories
are set incorrectly. Any users logged into the system can gain unauthorized root
privileges by exploiting this race condition.
The ps program has to see the information about all processes currently
running on the machine, so the program has to run as root. The first time ps
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is run on Solaris, it looks up the location of the process table inside the kernel
and other details it needs. Searching for this information is time-consuming, it
stores it in a file called /tmp/ps/data, where future invocations of ps can find
it. The assumption was that the user could delete only files that belong to him
in /tmp directory, but that was not the case. Any user was able to delete other
user’s files. The actions ps performs are:
• first put the information in a file called /tmp/ps.XXX ( XXX is the process
ID of ps);
• change the owner of the file to root;
• rename the file to /tmp/ps/data.
The attacker needs to write an exploit program that deletes the /tmp/ps/data
file. That action forces the ps program to create a new file and look in the
/tmp directory for a file starting with ps. When it finds the file, it deletes and
replaces it with a symbolic link to another file. The attacker will probably be
forced to run the exploit many times before a success occurs. When the exploit is
successful the ps will perform chown command on the symbolic link. The result
is that the file the link points to is owned by root.
The ps attack described above is ps race condition attack that does not
include buffer overflow. Ps attack included in the MIT Lincoln Labs data set
is based on buffer overflow and has signature almost identical to previously
described attacks. It can also be detected by looking at large values of header
and path of execution which is /usr/bin/ps in this case.
The resulting diagram is represented on Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Ps attack.
Although not used in the experiments for attack detection, we present the
description of format string attacks. According to many sources, format string
attacks are much easier to detect than buffer overflows. We also describe race
condition and stealthy attacks.
3.2.2 Format String Attacks
Just like buffer overflows, Format String Attacks are the result of bad program-
ming practices and are widely exploited. They are not as difficult to detect as
buffer overflows, but are dangerous if not detected on time. A typical exam-
ple of possible format string attack is when a programmer uses: printf(str);
instead of printf("%s", str);. Among many possible format commands the
most dangerous from the point of view of format string exploits is %n. The
definition of this command from the printf() man page is: The number of char-
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acters written so far is stored into the integer indicated by the int (or variant)
pointer argument. %n assumes that the corresponding argument to printf is
of type ‘‘int *’’ and writes back the number of bytes formatted so far. If the
attacker carefully chooses the format string then he can use the %n directive to
write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary word in the program’s memory. The
attacker can send a single packet of data to a vulnerable program and obtain a
remote (possibly root) shell. Because %n treats the corresponding argument as
an int * an effective format bug attack must go towards the top of the stack
(by inserting some number of %d directives) until it reaches a suitable word on
the stack. That word is treated as an int * and the attacker uses a %n to
overwrite a word nearly anywhere in the victim program’s address space. The
attacker always provides a format string that does not match the actual number
of arguments presented to printf.
3.2.3 Race condition attacks
By far the most dangerous User to Root Attack is the exploit of race conditions.
Most of race conditions are exploited in cases when setuid to root program
saves data in a file owned by the user executing the program. Three race con-
dition exploits are described in this section: race condition in managing tmp
files, binmail race condition and stealthy ps attack that includes buffer overflow
and race condition attack. The DARPA data set did not have any examples of
ps attack with race condition. The ps attacks presented there had only buffer
overflows that were used to gain root access.
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Race condition in managing tmp files
This is a simple example of race condition in Unix environment. As a result
of this exploit, the attacker obtains access to the passwd file. It exploits the
weakness in some versions of Solaris workstations in which any user can write
and delete files in tmp directory. The same fact is later exploited in a more
developed version of this attack that exploits race condition and buffer overflow.
This simple race condition can be presented in the following steps:
• /tmp/file and /etc/passwd refer to different objects, where file is the
file in /tmp directory;
• The attacker deletes the file from tmp directory before the process makes
the system call which will open the file;
• Hard link for /etc/passwd is created (/tmp/file);
• When open system call wants to open the /tmp/file file it actually follows
the newly created hard link and opens the /etc/passwd file;
• As a result of this exploit, the attacker can alter the password file and gain
access to the system.
The following figure represents the flow graph of race condition attack:
Binmail Race condition
The binmail program delivers mail by writing it into the recipient’s mailbox.
This race condition is exploited in the following way:
• lstat(2) system call is used;
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Figure 3.6: Diagram of race condition attack.
• If the mailbox is not a symbolic link append the letter to mailbox as root;
• Attacker deletes the mailbox file;
• The attacker creates a new file with the same name, which is a link to the
system password file;
• The letter will be appended to the password file
The following figure represents the binmail race condition attack:
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After binmail opens the file
                  /
/etc/usr/spool/mail
user X passwd
user X’s e−mail password datauser X’s e−mail
Figure 3.7: Diagram of binmail race condition attack.
3.2.4 Stealthy Ps Attack - Race condition and buffer over-
flow
The ps attack takes advantage of a race condition in the version of ps dis-
tributed with Solaris 2.5 and allows an attacker to execute an arbitrary code
with root privilege. This race condition can only be exploited to gain root ac-
cess if the user has access to the temporary files. According to the CERT web
page the ps program contains a vulnerability that does not sufficiently check the
arguments passed to it, so it is possible to overwrite the internal data space of
this program (the stack) while it is executing. To gain access to temporary files,
permissions for the /tmp and /var/tmp directories have to be set incorrectly.
When an attacker transfers his shell script to the attacked machine and runs it,
a root shell will be spawned.
The ps program has to see the information about all processes currently
running on the machine, so the program has to run as root. The first time ps is
run on Solaris, it looks up the location of the process table inside the kernel and
other details it needs. Since searching for this information is time-consuming,
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it is stored in /tmp/ directory in file called ps data (hence the full path is
/tmp/ps data), where future invocations of ps can find it. The assumption is
that the user can delete only files that belong to him in /tmp directory, but that
is not the case. Any user is able to delete other user’s files. The actions ps
performs can be described as follows:
• Put the information in a file called /tmp/ps.XXX ( XXX is the process ID
of ps);
• Change the owner of the file to root;
• Rename the file to /tmp/ps data.
The attacker needs to write an exploit program that deletes the /tmp/ps data
file. That action forces the ps program to create a new file and look in the /tmp
directory for a file starting with ps. When it finds the file, it deletes and replaces
it with a symbolic link to another file. The attacker will probably be forced to
run the exploit many times before the success. When the exploit is successful
the ps will perform chown command on the symbolic link. The result is that the
file the link points to is owned by the root.
The following diagram represents a stealthy ps attack that performs a
number of additional actions to ensure the maximum secrecy and to decrease
the probability of detection. Currently it is very difficult to detect stealthy
attacks, especially race conditions because they happen during a long period
of time and use masquerading, delayed execution of commands, encryption etc.
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Figure 3.8: Diagram of Ps attack.
3.2.5 Remote to User Attacks
It has previously been described what Remote to User attacks are and some typ-
ical examples were presented. Some examples of R2U attacks are the Dictionary,
Ftp-Write, Guest, Imap, Named, Sendmail attacks etc.; they exploit abuse of
feature, misconfiguration or bug to obtain access to the local host. Dictionary
and Guest attacks attempt to break into the system either by guessing badly
configured passwords or using the fact that on many systems there are at least a
few guest accounts where the user can login without any password or a password
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like “guest”, “anonymous” or no password at all. This type of attacks can be
avoided by setting an appropriate threshold that will raise the alarm if there are
unsuccessful attempts of logging into an account.
Ftp-write attack sequences were extracted from the MIT Lincoln Labs data
set using the same procedure as described in the previous section. This is an
attack where the anonymous ftp misconfiguration is abused. If the ftp server
is misconfigured in the way that a remote user can add files, the attacker can
add his own .rhosts file and log in again as user ftp. General sequence of




as user ftpservice on the
victim machine
Anonymously
log into the ftp
Create .rhosts file
home directory
with the string 
"++" within the 
Figure 3.9: Diagram of Ftp-write attack.
The mechanism of detecting Ftp-write attack is different from the previously
described attacks. The ftp login session can last over a long period of time and
that represents an obstacle in detecting an attack from memory point of view.
However, traces of an ftp-write attack given in MIT Lincoln Labs data set
indicate that the critical points that positively define the attack are observed in
the initial parts of the trace. After the first execve system call the ./rhosts
file is opened for reading, its status is checked, then its opened for writing, a
permission to create a file is set and then a symbolic link is established. After
that the attacker logs out and in the next login session it logs in as root. The
following graph in Figure 3.10 represents general goals for this type of attack:
The login phase of the attack, where the attacker logs in to anonymous ftp
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1 2 3 4
create file login read_hosts exit
Figure 3.10: Ftp-write attack.
server and changes .rhosts file so that it can login as root next time is presented
on Figure 3.11.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
exit
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7. Ownership of the
file changed
1. Start
2. Anonymous login succeeded
3. Status of .rhosts file obtained
8. File created
6. Pipe created
2−>3: stat(2) on ftp/.rhosts
4−>5: open(2) ftp/.rhosts
3−>4: stat(2) on /etc/shadow
1−>2: login




Figure 3.11: Ftp-write attack - create file phase.
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Chapter 4
Detection and classification algorithms
for Hidden Markov Models
The main contribution of this thesis is an attempt to detect and classify different
types of network intrusions (attacks). This chapter presents a short overview of
techniques and general models used for HMMs and then it presents one detection
algorithm and several classification algorithms (we emphasized on of these).
4.1 Introduction
We need to recognize a malicious user who executes system calls in certain order
in attempt to break into the computer system. In most cases of high-level attacks,
sequences of system calls can be interleaved within normal system behavior in
numerous ways.
Our goal is to detect when a particular sequence of harmful instructions that
could compromise security of our system has been performed.
The following plan for the recognition of malicious activity is proposed:
1. Generate a database of malicious actions and convert those actions in a
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set of HMMs, where each HMM is trained to recognize the attack pattern
from which it was generated.
2. Use the current state to rule out possible actions of the attacker due to
unmatched preconditions (“and” sets of subconditions are not yet fulfilled);
3. The IDS performs matching of HMMs against possible attack sequences
and produces a score for each of the patterns;
4. Use obtained scores to find the likelihoods of the attacker’s actions that
were generated and construct a vector that consists of probabilities that
the user is performing each of recorded actions, i.e. that the user is actually
the attacker.
There are several approaches that can be applied to the problem and each
of them brings its own difficulties. The specific steps described above may differ
slightly among different approaches. The notation that we are going to use is as
follows. We denote our set of attack models as Λ = λ1, . . . , λm. To recognize an
attack we need to compute the probability of seeing the observation sequence
O = o1, . . . , on given each attack model λi. We consider O = (o1, . . . , oT ) to
be the observed data and the underlying state sequence q = (q1, . . . , qT ) to be
hidden or unobserved.
4.2 Hidden Markov Models
Before proceeding to our problem formulation and proposed solutions we present
the overview of notation used for HMMs. The notation in this thesis corresponds
to the notation used in [39].
66
A discrete HMM is specified by the following triple
λ = (A, B, π) (4.1)
A represents the state transition matrix of the underlying Markov chain and is
defined as (where st denotes the state of the Markov chain at time t):
A = [aij ] = [p(st+1 = j | st = i)], i, j = 1, . . . , N.
B is the observation matrix and is defined as (where xt is the output (observation)
at time t):
B = [bij ] = [p(xt = j | st = i)], i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . , K.
π is the initial state probability distribution of the underlying Markov states and
is defined as
π = [πi = p(s1 = i)], i = 1, . . . , N.
Given appropriate values of N , K, A, B and π the HMM can be used as a
generator for an observation sequence. In our case we suppose that the number
of states N and alphabet of observations K are finite. The joint probability of
an HMM sequence of length n is











To be able to use the algorithm that is presented next we need to compute the
likelihood of a sequence of HMM observations given λ, P (X | λ), which is done
by using the ”forward variable”. According to definitions in [39] the forward
variable of an HMM is defined as
αt(i) = p(x1, x2, . . . , xt, st = i | λ) (4.2)
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Hence, P (X | λ) is the sum of αt(i)’s. Recalling the solution of the forward part
of the forward-backward procedure [39], αt(i) can be computed recursively. The
initial condition in the forward procedure is
α1(j) = π(j)bj(x1); 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4.3)







bj(xt+1); 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1; 1 ≤ j ≤ N (4.4)
where bj(xt+1) is the conditional density function given the underlying Markov
state at time t is j.
We suppose that we have M HMMs as possible models for the observed data
and we need to test which of the M HMMs matches the incoming sequence. In the
framework of intrusion detection the problem can be formulated as follows: given
M attack models in the form of Hidden Markov Models with known parameters,
detect the one that matches the incoming sequence with the highest probability.
However, in the case of detecting an attack the incoming sequence may or may
not match one of the HMM models of attack. In case it does not match one of
the attack models we need to consider two cases: either the incoming sequence
is not an attack or it is an unknown attack that we don’t have in our database.
In this report we assume that the incoming HMM matches one of M HMMs in
the system.
The problem of M-ary detection is solved with calculating log-likelihoods
for each of the possible models given the observed sequence and finding the
maximum. The model with the maximal log likelihood (closest to zero) wins
and the attack is classified accordingly. In this thesis M=5. The likelihood
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function is calculated as follows:








Experiments are performed using the 1998 and 1999 DARPA/LL offline eval-
uation data. Both data sets had to be used due to the fact that there are no
examples of ps attack in the 1998 data set. Lincoln Labs recorded program
behavior data using the Basic Security Module (BSM) of Solaris. We used BSM
audit records that correspond to system calls. Each record provides information
like name of the system call, a subset of arguments, return value, process ID,
user ID etc. We used the system call information and information about the
payload size associated with each system call.
In order to use the BSM data we had to develop an environment that would
parse the BSM audit logs into a form that can later be used for detection and
classification of attacks. The information about payload size and execution of
an unexpected program was used for attack detection. Hypotheses testing was
used for attack classification.
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4.3.2 Data processing phase
Step one
The initial step deals with the whole BSM file that contains the daily activity
performed on machine pascal and contains both normal and abnormal activity.
Since many of the processes are interleaved, the original BSM file most probably
has attacks interleaved within normal processes and which can be distinguished
only by looking at the process numbers. In the initial step we divide the whole
BSM file into chunks of length of 100 system calls. Each system call is assigned
a number according to the order of appearance in the BSM sequence. The first
couple of lines in the BSM file are system-related and we don’t include them in
any of the chunks.
As the result of phase one we have (total number of system calls in the
BSM sequence)/100 files named WeeknumberDay.bsm.txt.split.i, each of which
contains 100 enumerated system calls. In order to differentiate among abnormal
and normal behavior we ran another algorithm. Denote one randomly chosen
system call number as k. The algorithm observes the payload size associated
with each system call. If the system call has payload greater than 300, the
program outputs 2 ∗ k. Otherwise, it outputs 2 ∗ k − 1. The first step of the
algorithm outputs another file that contains the total number of system calls,
their names and associated numbers. It lists the even numbers that appeared
in the BSM file (even numbers=system calls with high payload). In addition
to observing the oversized arguments, the algorithm also monitors the traces in
BSM files for violations in the form of unexpected program execution (shell). If
both conditions are fulfilled (oversized argument and execution of unexpected
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program) there is an ongoing attack. The testing phase detects the type of the
attack and classifies it.
The outputs of the first run are:
1. Total number of system calls;
2. Total number of different system calls;
3. List of enumerated system calls with shell execution in order of appearance
in the BSM file;
4. List of even numbers in the files (system calls that have payloads greater
than a threshold, in our case 300). We use this information in creating the
B matrix for HMM training in later stages of the algorithm.
Step 2
This step takes the original BSM file as an input and looks for instances of each
attack (if we want to have instances of 4 attacks, we have to run the program
four times to get the result). This step is not computationally intensive as the
previous one. Step one takes from 45min to more than 2h, depending on the
length of BSM file and step 2 takes a couple of minutes to run. It produces
meta-files WeeknumberDay.AttackName.txt containing line numbers of system
calls issued by observed programs and the actual system calls with all parameters
from the original BSM file.
The MIT data provides the information regarding the attack distribution
throughout 5 weeks of training and 2 weeks of testing. The second week of
training was not usable by the detection procedure since it contains only tcp
data. Week 6 contained only ffbconfig and eject attacks. Week 7 could not
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be used since it contained only tcp data. Hence, the only attacks where multiple
hypothesis testing approach was possible were ffbconfig and eject.
Step 3
The last step extracts sequences of system calls of length 100 and labels files that
contain bad sequences (for example, ffb-bad.txt or format-bad.txt) using the files
created in the previous step and the original BSM file. The resulting file contains
system calls issued by the attacked program and some other system calls from
other programs due to the fact that the divided files may (and probably will)
catch parts of other programs.
As a result we have the original BSM file chunked into sequences of length
100 system calls, one file (meta file) for each attack that contains the lines from
BSM file that contain execution of programs of interest (ffbconfig, format, eject
or ps) and meta-files chunked into sequences of 100 system calls. Not all of those
meta-files are bad. To decide which files are going to be used for training we use
information provided by MIT Lincoln Labs that precisely states at what time the
attacks are executed. One potential problem can appear in this approach and
is the only cause of misclassification among different types of attacks. Training
is performed on chunks that start exactly when the attack starts and testing
is performed on sequences obtained by chunking the original BSM file. It may
happen that the testing files (first and last) contain a large portion of normal
sequences, which causes that the structure of training and testing file may sig-
nificantly differ. That problem may be solved by sliding window approach on
training sequences, but on the other hand, this approach increases the number
of staring models and increases the complexity of the model. Two possible solu-
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tions of misclassification among different types of attacks are described in more
detail in the following section.
4.3.3 Training
In this thesis we assume that the attack models are already known. The goal
is to detect and classify the incoming sequence using the models generated on
already known attacks. We trained the HMMs on attack sequences generated
in the third step of the algorithm presented in previous sections. Each of the
sequences is sequentially loaded and parameters are generated using the HMM
toolbox in Matlab. We initially chose to have 5 observations and 10 iterations in
training. B matrix size is 5x2*k and A matrix is 5x5. We initially chose all even
columns of the B matrix to be equal to zero, except the ones that correspond
to the system calls with high payload and all odd columns are greater than zero
and generated by the Matlab funcion mk stochastic (for example if even system
calls that appear in the sequence are execve (92), open (24) and ioctl (88), all
even columns in B matrix except 24, 88 and 92 will be equal to zero). Matrix A
is chosen to be diagonal and is generated by using the mk stochastic function
from the toolbox.
Each attack is represented with 4-6 sequences of length 100 but only one or
two of them contain the actual attack (depends on whether the same sequence
contains oversized argument and shell executions or not).
After sequentially loading the attack sequences and training parameters on
them in 10 iterations we will get 10 different log likelihoods for each model. Since
the initial parameters for A and π matrices are created using Matlab function
mk stochastic and parameters of B matrix are adjusted to the model up to a
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certain point the initial estimation of log likelihood is low (first iteration). After
several iterations the parameters of trained HMM are found and A, B and π
matrices don’t change any more. An example of log-likelihood estimation from
training on eject attack from Week 5 Tuesday is presented in figure 4.1:
The training procedure consists of training each of malicious sequences on








Figure 4.1: Procedure of parameter adjustment during HMM training.
the same input parameters Ain, Bin and πin, producing an output HMM with
parameters πi, Ai and Bi that characterize that specific malicious sequence (i
denotes one of possible HMM models and varies in different training sets, but
is usually less than 10). This property of HMMs that each set of parameters
πi, Ai and Bi fits a specific malicious sequence is used in the testing phase for
classification of attacks in two levels: normal/abnormal and attack1/attack2.
Training was performed on MIT Lincoln Labs data from weeks 1 to 5. The
training data used in this thesis is presented in table 4.1.
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Week Day Attack name Variant
1 Monday format clear
1 Monday ffb clear
3 Monday ffb clear
4 Friday ffb add .rhosts, stealthy
4 Friday format stealthy
5 Monday ffb ftp’s over exploit files
5 Monday ffb chmod files
5 Monday ffb executes attack
5 Monday format clear
5 Tuesday eject clear
5 Tuesday eject clear
5 Wednesday eject stealthy
5 Friday eject run self encoded exploit
Table 4.1: MIT Lincoln Labs training data sets
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4.3.4 Detection
We concentrated on four programs: ffbconfig, format, eject and ps. The
attacks on eject, fdformat and ffbconfig exploited a buffer overflow condi-
tion to execute a shell with root privileges. The goal was to create hypotheses
for each of the attacks and classify the attacks in the appropriate category. The
classical rule for hypothesis testing when we set a threshold for each of the hy-
potheses could not be used. The hypothesis testing algorithm is based on the
winning score rule, where winning score is the log-likelihood that is closest to
zero. We denote the winning hypothesis with HWIN . Hence, the hypothesis




H1 if loglik1 = maxi{logliki}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
H2 if loglik2 = maxi{logliki}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
H3 if loglik3 = maxi{logliki}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
H4 if loglik4 = maxi{logliki}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
(4.6)
The first hypothesis, H0 corresponds to normal behavior and that hypothesis
is not used in the classification algorithm. H0 is used in detection algorithm
using the criterion that is presented in figure 4.2.
As seen from the figure, the detection algorithm loads every sequence i, where
i = {1, . . . , N} and N is the total number of sequences of length 100 in the given
BSM sequence. Then it tests whether the sequence has either shell execution or
oversized argument. In either case, the sequence is classified as anomalous. Oth-
erwise the sequence is normal. When all N sequences are tested, the algorithm
finishes and proceeds to the classification phase, using only sequences extracted




















Figure 4.2: Detection of abnormal sequences.
that corresponds to normal sequence and HA that corresponds to anomalous
sequence. Hence, if the sequence contains either shell execution or has payload
greater than 300, the winning hypothesis is HA and the sequence is processed to
the classification step. Otherwise, the winning hypothesis is H0 and the sequence
is declared to be normal and is not considered in further steps.
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4.3.5 Classification
This section tests on hypotheses Hi, i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, that correspond to different
types of attacks. In case of 4 buffer overflows the hypotheses are: H1 (ffbconfig),
H2 (fdformat), H3 (eject) and H4 (ps). The algorithm is depicted on figure ( 4.3)
and explained in detail in the following sections. However, due to limitations
of the data set, that are going to be explained in later sections, the maximum
number of hypotheses was 3, corresponding to states with no attack, ffbconfig
and eject attack in one case and no attack, ffbconfig and format in another
case. For theoretical purposes we also considered testing of all hypotheses on
one data set that contained only 2 out of 4 attacks.
 an even number
 for each bad model with
 step by building an HMM
 extracted in the previous
Train on bad sequences
   obtained in the previous step
   sequences using parameters
   train each of the testing
DATA PROCESSING
TRAINING TESTING
of a certain attack sequence 
as malicious and classify it
declare the tested sequence 
if the log−likelihood is less than
a certain threshold then the
sequence is normal. If it falls
in the scope of log likelihoods
   sequences as ’bad’
   previous step and mark the
   the sequence obtained in the
   extract the system calls from
   extract the attack sequence
   from the original BSM sequence
    divide the BSM file in sequences
    of length 100 system calls
   mark the system calls with 
   payload >300 with even numbers
   and all others with odd numbers
Figure 4.3: Detection and classification system scheme.
Hypothesis testing was preformed on BSM chunks that contained either shell
execution or large payload. The sequences were loaded into a column matrix
which was used for hypothesis testing. We created a number of HMMs fitted
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to ffbconfig, format, eject and ps testing sequences. Parameters obtained
during training (πi, Ai and Bi) were used as input parameters for testing. We
calculated the log-likelihood for each of testing sequences using each of the mod-
els obtained by training as input parameters. If the tested sequence does not
fit the malicious model, the log likelihood ratio converges to -∞ after the first
iteration. Each sequence that had log likelihood greater than -400 was classified
as corresponding to an attack. Otherwise it was declared to be a false alarm.
The threshold of -400 was chosen based on the observation that the minimum
log-likelihood observed on training sequences was around -300. Any other small
negative value could have been used.
Due to the fact that most of buffer overflows have almost identical structure,
the only distinguishing characteristic among those attacks is usually the program
that is executed during the attack. In most cases of testing an additional criterion
had to be used. If a sequence is classified as both attack 1 and attack 2, two
algorithms can be applied to avoid misclassification among the attacks.
4.4 Algorithm 1
This algorithm uses the property that the more similar two models are, the log-
likelihood ratio is closer to zero. Hence, if a sequence is classified as both attack 1
and attack 2, the testing algorithm compares the log-likelihood of the sequence
when it is classified as attack 1 to the log-likelihood when it is classified as
attack 2. The attack with larger log likelihood wins and the sequence is classified




This algorithm is based on the fact that each tested sequence is named according
to the line where its system call is placed in the original BSM file. The same
program applied in the step 2 of training can be applied for testing since its
only role is to determine the line numbers where each of the programs of interest
is executed. Simply, if sequence W6Thursday.bsm.split.1600.txt is classified as
both attack 1 (attack on program 1) and attack 2 (attack on program 2) and
our program determines that program 1 is being executed at line 1600, this
sequence is classified as attack 1. When we used this criterion there was no
misclassification among the attacks. However, this particular algorithm cannot
be used for detection of any attacks other than buffer overflows. For example, if
we need to classify between a buffer overflow on eject program and some other
type of attack on eject program this algorithm will not be of any use. But if
we determine by the structure of the sequence that the attack is buffer overflow,




All test performed on data sets include hypothesis testing. Only testing among
ffbconfig and eject attacks and ffbconfig and format attacks is performed
using 3 hypotheses: H0 for normal, H1 for ffbconfig and H2 for fdformat and
H3 for eject. In the first case testing was performed on the actual testing data
from Week 6 and in the second case testing was performed on Week 5 Monday due
to the lack of fdformat attacks in testing data. Week 6 Thursday contained 3
ffbconfig and 12 eject attacks. Week 5 Monday contained only one ffbconfig
and one fdformat attack. Because of that, we performed training and testing
on all possible combination of sequences and the results obtained were almost
identical. Hypothesis testing using 5 hypotheses was not possible due to the
fact that the testing data set does not contain any fdformat or ps attacks. For
testing those attacks we trained each of those attacks on data from 2 days and
tested it on data from the third day. For ps attack we used 1999 data.
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5.1 Detection of ffbconfig and eject attacks
Due to already presented difficulties, the hypothesis testing was performed using
3 hypotheses. Hypothesis H0 corresponds to normal sequences, H1 to ffbconfig
attack and H3 to eject attack. Testing was performed only on those sequences
that had shell execution or even number (the sequences that were extracted in
Step 1 of the algorithm). The results obtained in testing phase are first presented
in the form of graphs and tables and then discussed.
Figure 5.1: Ffbconfig and eject tested on Week 6 Thursday.
Input parameters for tested sequences were HMM parameters obtained dur-
ing the training phase. No eject attacks were classified as normal and no ffbconfig
attacks were classified as normal. The only misclassification that happened was
that some sequences were classified as both ffbconfig and eject attacks. There
was a total of 9251 sequences. 9233 were normal, 6 sequences characterized ff-
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bconfig attack and 12 sequences characterized eject attack. When Algorithm 1
was applied to the sequences it led to the misclassification rate of 20% for eject
attacks (8 out of 10 attacks were classified correctly) and 0% misclassification
rate for ffbconfig. When Algorithm 2 was applied it led to misclassification rate
of 0%. There were 0.368% of false positives and no false negatives. Hence, the
only imperfection of the algorithm reflects in misclassification among different
types of attacks, not among normal and anomalous. The results are presented




Table 5.1: Confusion matrix for the case of testing between 3 hypotheses: nor-
mal, ffbconfig and eject
Normal Ffbconfig Eject
Normal 9200 14 19
Ffbconfig 0 6 0
Eject 0 3 9
Table 5.2: Detection and misclassification rates for the case of testing between
normal, ffbconfig and eject
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5.2 Detection of ffbconfig and format attacks
Since there are no instances of format attack in weeks 6 and 7, we had to use
two weeks from weeks 1-5 for training and one for testing. Applying the same
procedure as in the previous case, the false alarm rate was 0.3% and misclassi-
fication rate was 0% using either of criterions presented in the previous section.
Figure 5.2: Ffbconfig and format detection on Week 5 Monday.
False positive rate was 0.319% and there were no false negatives. No format






Table 5.3: Confusion matrix in case of multiple hypothesis testing
Normal Ffbconfig Format
Normal 99.68% 0.046% 0.24%
Ffbconfig 0 100% 0
Format 0 0 100%
Table 5.4: Detection and misclassification rates in case of detection and classifi-
cation of multiple types of attacks
5.3 Detection and classification of ps attacks
Due to the fact that ps attack appears only in 1999 data, we could not test
detection of ps attacks using any other hypotheses except H0 (normal) and H4
(ps). The false alarm rate was 0.3% and there was no misclassification, all




Table 5.5: Confusion matrix for detection of Ps ata7k
There were 0.47% false positives and no false negatives. The results are
presented on figure 5.3 and in table 5.5.
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Figure 5.3: Ps detection.
5.4 Detection of eject attacks
The sequences were trained on three weeks of data and tested on the fourth one.
Like in the previous cases all instances of attack were classified as anomalous
and very low percentage of normal instances were misclassified. The graphical




Table 5.6: Confusion matrix for detection of Eject attack
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Figure 5.4: Detection of eject attack.
5.5 Detection of fdformat attacks
Fdformat training was performed on data sets from two weeks and tested on
data set from one week, that contained one attack. All possible combinations of
training and testing data were used and the results were almost identical. The
false alarm rate was low and there were no false negatives, as in the previous
cases. The results are presented in figure 5.5 and table 5.7. As seen in the




Table 5.7: Confusion matrix for detection of Fdformat attack
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Figure 5.5: Detection of fdformat attack.
5.6 Detection of ffbconfig attacks
Finally the results for detection of ffbconfig attacks are presented in figure 5.6
and the confusion matrix is presented in table 5.8. As we can see, the confusion





Table 5.8: Confusion matrix for Ffbconfig attack
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This thesis demonstrated that it is possible to model network attacks with models
that consist of small finite number of states. These models can be used for both
detection and classification of attacks. The method presented in this thesis
was applied and tested only to attacks exploiting buffer overflows due to the
non availability of data for testing it on other attacks, like ftp-write or race
condition attacks. We developed models for other attacks and we believe that
they are applicable for detection and classification of other attacks, not only
buffer overflows. The algorithm can also be applied for detecting race condition
attacks since they add additional loops in program behavior, that do not exist in
normal behavior. The method presented in this thesis can be used in combination
with static analysis tools to achieve even higher detection rate and classify the
attacks that the static analysis tools may have missed.
The algorithm presented in the previous chapter is motivated by the attack
models developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Due to already mentioned reasons
the results were presented only for buffer overflow attacks. Since we needed uni-
form representation of all attacks with the least amount of additional rules, only
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key features of those models were selected: large header, execution of a specific
program (ffbconfig, eject, etc.) and shell execution. Other specific features of
attacks could be used, like large amount of stat commands in eject attacks. The
feature of all training and testing data sets was that each attack was character-
ized with ksh execution and those were the only appearances of ksh in given
BSM sequences. However, it is uncertain if the ksh execution is a specific char-
acteristic of the MIT Lincoln Labs data set (actually characteristic of machines
that were used for data generation, in our examples machine pascal) or it is a
characteristic of all buffer overflow attacks. There are three different rules for
detection of anomalous sequences that can be applied.
1. If there is a ksh execution in the sequence classify that specific sequence
as anomalous. Otherwise classify it as normal.
2. If there is a sequence that has execve system call with large payload (even
number after Step 1 of my algorithm) followed by a sequence with ksh ex-
ecution classify either of the sequences as an attack. In this rule, “followed
by” does not necessarily mean “immediately followed by”. The sequence
with ksh execution can be separated from the sequence with large payload
with several interleaved sequences.
3. Mark all sequences with shell execution (ksh, sh, bsh etc.) as potentially
dangerous. Build in the information about payload in B matrix of HMM.
Test only on sequences with shell execution and large payload.
The first two algorithms have detection rate of 100%. However, as mentioned
before those rules are limited only to a specific data set. The second algorithm
was proved to be efficient on this particular year from MIT Lincoln Labs Data
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set. This method may not be able to detect many of the attacks in case when
globbing, described in Chapter 3, is performed since the program will observe
only unrelated symbols, but the operating system is going to interpret them,
as ksh execution, for example. Hence, the attack will be misclassified as a
normal sequence and this method may possibly lead to a certain number of false
negatives. The third algorithm has very high detection rate, although not 100%
as the previous ones. The obvious advantage of this algorithm is that it does not
depend on any feature of this specific data set. It is based on general features
of buffer overflow attacks: shell execution (any shell, not only ksh) and large
payload. This method may also miss some shell executions for the same reason as
algorithm 2, but in this case it will still have a sequence with oversized argument
that can be recognized by trained HMMs. This algorithm leads to around 0.1%
to 0.5% of false negatives. Attack detection in this thesis is defined as detection
of at least one sequence of that attack. If sequence number 1000 is classified as
ffbconfig attack, then automatically the whole program with the process ID that
corresponds to sequence 1000 is classified as anomalous ffbconfig program.
The classification rate in most cases is 100% when method 1 described in
the previous section is used (observing values of log-likelihoods) and is always
100% when method 2 is used. This justifies the approach taken in this thesis
and proves that the behavior of attacks can be completely captured by HMMs.
The contribution of this thesis is reflected in the area of classification. There
are a lot of publications that use different models for detection between normal
and anomalous. None of them puts emphasis on automatic classification of
attacks. Some of the publications use HMMs for detection of attacks but there
are no specified methods or algorithms for HMM application or justification for
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using HMMs for detection. All of those approaches used training on normal
sequences which caused high complexity of the algorithm. This thesis uses an
approach that is based on training on anomalous sequences. Hence, each attack
can be represented with 3-4 HMM models. Training is performed very efficiently
since it is not performed on the BSM file with hundreds of thousands of system
calls, but on a couple of files, each of length 100 system calls. Instead of having
either a large number of models for normal sequences or high training time,
we have an efficient algorithm that performs testing using only 3-4 models for
each attack and testing is performed on around 400 to 700 sequences, which
represents around 2-4% of the total number of sequences of the initial data set.
The strength of this approach is that it chooses only potential attacks in both
the training and testing sets.
This approach was applied and tested in the course of work reported here only
for detecting and classifying of buffer overflow attacks. This approach can also be
used for detecting race conditions, since race condition attacks are characterized
with large number of executions of a certain command, for example deletion of
/tmp directory. This will result in a specific construction of abnormal HMM
which will significantly differ from normal ones. However, this method cannot
be applied for detection of race condition attacks that are performed over a long
period of time. The strength of this approach is that the attacker cannot change
the behavior of normal over time by slowly adding more and more abnormal
sequences since we are using anomalous sequences for training.
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6.1 Future work
We plan to apply the same (or similar) algorithm to other types of attacks, not
only buffer overflows since each attack has some characteristic sequences. The
model for ftp-write already exists and we plan to test it for detection of race
condition attacks. The thesis demonstrated that the method is efficient for both
detection and classification. The normal/abnormal detection level is going to
perform on the same high level as when applied on buffer overflows. The mis-
classification of attacks happened mostly in weeks that have both User to Root
and Remote to Local attacks. The weeks that had only DoS attacks and buffer
overflows had very low false alarm rate and no misclassification. Therefore, we
believe that, if rules for detection of other attacks are added, the misclassifica-
tion rate will be reduced even more. Not all of those attacks can be detected
with static checking tools. The most convenient attacks for detection with static
analysis are buffer overflows and most of static analysis tools are targeted to-
wards detection of buffer overflows. We can also use the models developed in
Chapter 3 for classification between different types of attacks, specifically, to
classify whether the attack is buffer overflow or some other type of attack. The
main problem is lack of data since we cannot claim that the algorithm works
if training is performed on one sequence and testing is performed on another
sequence from the same week or by using an attack performed by the same in-
truder. That is the main reason why this extension was not applied during the
work reported here . The attacks that had most instances were buffer overflows
and that is the reason why we applied and tested our method on such attacks.
This algorithm is used for detection of already known attacks. However, it can
always classify the sequence as normal or anomalous. If the sequence is classified
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as anomalous and it does not fit any of the existing models, it can be named
as unknown attack and passed on to another system that will determine if the
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